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Abstract Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition
in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly
contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that
this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and
that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical
exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragma-
tism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind
and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic,
Bnarcissistic^ character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to
explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive process-
ing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort
that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide.
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1 Introduction
Brains are prediction machines that restlessly seek to match incoming sensory inputs
against internally generated, model-based predictions of such inputs. Or so says
Bpredictive processing,^ a recent overarching theory of neural function in cognitive
and computational neuroscience (Clark 2013, 2016; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013). In its
most ambitious formulation, this neural function is itself a special case of a more
fundamental imperative in biological systems to maintain themselves within the narrow
subset of biophysical states required for homeostasis (Friston 2009, 2010). Given its
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explanatory scope and far-reaching consequences for our understanding of the nature of
life and mind, predictive processing is currently enjoying an enormous amount of
attention in both the scientific and philosophical literature.
As some have noted (e.g. Hohwy 2013), the emphasis on (approximate) Bayesian
inference over hierarchically structured generative models at the heart of this emerging
framework appears to straightforwardly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind
and experience. In this paper, I argue that this apparent tension rests on philosophical
overlays not motivated by the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact
ideally positioned for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange.
I structure the paper as follows.
In Section 2, I identify three fundamental and unifying commitments in the prag-
matist conception of mind and experience: the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts
of the mind, the organism-relativity of experience, and the social construction of human
thought. In Section 3, I articulate the broadly BCartesian^ presentation of predictive
processing as advanced by Hohwy (2013; 2014; Kiefer and Hohwy 2017) and explain
how it contradicts each of these commitments. In the rest of the paper, I then argue that
this Cartesian interpretation mischaracterises predictive processing, and I explain how
the two frameworks can in fact positively illuminate one another.
In Section 4, I argue that predictive processing both vindicates and illuminates the
first two pragmatist commitments outlined in Section 2: namely, the primacy of
pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind and the organism-relativity of experience.
In Section 5, I argue that this pragmatic, Bnarcissistic^ (Akins 1996) character of
prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive
normativity of intentionality. Finally, in Section 6 I argue that predictive processing
therefore positively mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly
the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought—the third and most
controversial pragmatist commitment I outline in Section 2—can provide. I then offer a
preliminary sketch of what such an account might look like.
First, however, I address an obvious question: why bring these two frameworks into
contact with one another? Why relate a contemporary research programme in cognitive
neuroscience to a philosophical tradition that emerged in late nineteenth century North
America? I think there are three important reasons.
First, pragmatism is and always has been a naturalistic philosophical movement,
Bstressing the continuity of human beings with the rest of nature^ and emphasising Bthe
need for philosophy to be informed by, and open to, the significance of novel scientific
developments^ (Bernstein 2010, 8; cf. also Bacon 2012). Of course, the naturalism in
question is rarely metaphysical naturalism,1 the thesis that reality is exclusively and
exhaustively described in the vocabulary of natural science, but rather what Price
(2013) helpfully terms Bsubject naturalism,^ the view that philosophy should start from
the assumption that we are natural creatures in a natural environment (Brandom 2010,
208–10). From the perspective of pragmatists, then, it is interesting to see how an
extremely ambitious theory like predictive processing bears on its central commit-
ments. After all, it aspires to tell us what kinds of natural creatures we are.
1 A notable exception to this claim is Quine (e.g. 1960), although Quine’s relation to the pragmatist tradition is
complicated (cf. Hylton 2007).
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This leads to a second reason, however: as noted above, insofar as predictive
processing does bear on the pragmatist tradition, it seems to be in explicit tension with
it. Peirce first introduced pragmatism at the Metaphysical Club in late nineteenth
century Massachusetts with the aim of rejecting Bthe spirit of Cartesianism^ (Peirce
2017), and a unifying aspiration among pragmatist thinkers has been to disarm
philosophy from a picture of minds as Bmirrors of nature^ (Rorty 1979), passively
re-presenting the nature and structure of some pre-given reality (Bacon 2012; Price
2011). For this reason, the early American pragmatists are often seen as helping to give
birth to the tradition of anti-representationalism in psychology whose later manifesta-
tions were mid-twentieth century scientific behaviourism and the tradition of ecological
psychology (Chemero 2009, ch.2; also Heft 2001; Rockwell 2005). Predictive process-
ing, by contrast, at least appears to be a robustly representational theory of the mind,
advancing what Hohwy (2013) calls a neuroscientific vindication of a conception of
minds as mirrors of nature and a neurobiological approach to intentionality (see
Section 2.3 below). Hostility to such a Cartesian framework has thus motivated
hostility to predictive processing itself (cf. Anderson and Chemero 2013).
Several authors (especially Clark 2016; but see also Allen and Friston 2016;
Anderson 2017; Bruineberg et al. 2016; Gallagher and Allen 2016; Hutto 2017;
Kirchhoff 2017; Seth 2015) have recently sought to undermine these putative implica-
tions of the theory. Their focus has consisted predominantly in connecting predictive
processing to the explicit research agenda and implications of B4E cognition,^ however.2
Whilst I draw on some of this excellent work below, my aim here is to address broader
themes in the pragmatist tradition that can be articulated without the idiosyncratic
vocabulary of that research programme and that are not shackled to some of its more
Bradical^ commitments (see Section 5). As I will present it, pragmatism provides an
extremely general conception of the human animal within which more specific philo-
sophical and scientific research can be conducted.
Finally, this paper is not just defensive but constructive: as I argue below, prominent
and misguided Cartesian interpretations of predictive processing have obscured the way
in which the two frameworks can be brought into mutually illuminating contact with
one another. Substantiating this claim is the aim of Sections 4, 5, and 6.
First, however, I introduce what the defining commitments in pragmatism are
(Section 2), before turning to outline those tenets of predictive processing under its
maximally Cartesian guise that contradict each of these commitments (Section 3).
2 Pragmatism, mind, and experience
It would be misguided to try and specify a set of specific theoretical convictions shared
by all pragmatists (Bacon 2012, i). My aim here is thus more modest. First, I will focus
on commitments in the pragmatist tradition that are sufficiently general to encompass
what Godfrey-Smith (2015, 807) calls an otherwise Bdiverse and mutable collection of
ideas^ within a single, overarching framework. The hope is that this generality will
enable the specific views and theories of pragmatist thinkers to be viewed as manifes-
tations of underlying, more general commitments, and thus allow for a conception of
2 B4e^ for embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended cognition (cf. Clark 2011).
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pragmatism as an evolving tradition not too strongly shackled to the peculiarities of any
individual pragmatist’s ideas. Second, I will restrict my scope to those general com-
mitments that explicitly concern the nature of thought, experience, and the mind.
Still, I stress that the following treatment is not intended to be either exhaustive or
definitive, and it is not intended to be in competition with treatments that identify
different core themes in the pragmatist tradition. To take one important example,
Menary (2015) has recently conducted an excellent survey of the pragmatist founda-
tions of the Bpragmatic turn^ in cognitive science, and explicitly related these founda-
tions to predictive processing. The three core themes that he outlines, however, are
distinct from the ones I have chosen to focus on. Nevertheless, my treatment is intended
to complement Menary’s, not oppose it. I hope that by focusing on alternative themes,
the conversation he instigated can be extended and broadened.
Despite these qualifications, I do think that in conjunction with one another the three
commitments I articulate constitute something like a centre of theoretical gravity in the
pragmatist tradition, an attractor around which otherwise heterogeneous interests and
substantive positions have arisen. This section articulates and elaborates those
commitments.
2.1 Coping, not copying
The first commitment is to the functional primacy of action and pragmatic success in
accounts of the mind. As Brandom (2002a, 40) puts it, pragmatism is Ba movement
centred on the primacy of the practical^ (my emphasis). On this view, we should
understand thought and language not as passive mediums for re-presenting the nature
of nature but as practical tools for facilitating action and more general kinds of practical
success. In the Deweyan slogan popularised by Rorty (1989, 1999), cognition is for
Bcoping, not copying.^
This conviction constituted a unifying theme in the early American pragmatist
tradition. Peirce, James and Dewey all sought to understand thought in terms of its
role in guiding action (Godfrey-Smith 2015). Peirce et al. (1974) argued that philos-
ophy should examine the nature of thought and ideas in terms of their difference to
human behaviour, and his Bpragmatic maxim^ ties the meanings of concepts to their
practical effects. James (1907/2000) famously extended this maxim beyond the realm
of empirical enquiry to account for the significance of all areas of human thought and
practice, not just science. And Dewey (1925, 1948) developed elaborate proposals of
the relationship between theoretical and practical goals in a sustained effort to under-
mine what he called the Bspectator theory of knowledge,^ a theory in which cognitive
processes are decoupled from practical ends (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2015, 804). BConcepts,
theories and systems of thought… are tools,^ he argued. BAs in the case of all tools
their value resides not in themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the
consequences of their use^ (Dewey 1920/1948, 145).
The emphasis on the relationship between belief and action is less pronounced in the
work of neo-pragmatist authors like Quine, Rorty, Brandom, and Price (Godfrey-Smith
2015). Nevertheless, the primacy of pragmatic copingmore generally in understanding
thought and language has remained central. Rorty (1989, 1999), for example,
(in)famously argues that numerous philosophical problems arise from a misguided
Brepresentationalism^ that fails to take account of our status as the biological upshots of
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fundamentally Darwinian processes, biological upshots whose concern is with coping
with the world, not copying it. Further, this commitment to the Bprimacy of the
practical^ is continued in the work of prominent neo-pragmatists like Brandom
(1994, 2010) and Price (2011, 2013), both of whom seek to understand our concepts
and linguistic frameworks not first and foremost as representations of reality but as
tools that serve various (often orthogonal) practical functions in our lives.
What unifies these diverse philosophers is a shared conviction that the mind should
be understood not as an inner arena designed to recapitulate reality, but as a functionally
crucial node in a complex web of forces that enable an organism to cope with its
variegated environments given its many practical ends. Viewed from this general
perspective, we can see the more specific views of individual pragmatist authors—
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, for example, or James’s theory of truth—as manifestations
of this general stance, not essential components of it.
A common objection to an emphasis on coping over copying is that the two are not
mutually exclusive—indeed, that copying seems to be effectively mandated by the
kinds of practical coping exhibited by humans and other animals (Blackburn 2006; see
Section 5.2 below). To see why pragmatists generally reject this line of reasoning, we
must turn to a second core theme in the tradition.3
2.2 Contingency
If action and pragmatic coping are the most fundamental concepts in the pragmatist
tradition, contingency is not far behind (Price 2011; Rorty 1989). In its hostility to the
metaphors of Bmirroring^ and Bcopying^ resides a profound attachment to the impor-
tance of the subject in the construction of its experienced reality. On this view,
contingent properties of the organism are functionally crucial to the contents of its
experience, thereby undermining a common dualism in which the contents of mind
reflect independently identifiable contents in the world. As Dewey (LW, 14, 17) put it,
Bthe organism – the self, the Bsubject^ of action – is a factor within experience and not
something outside of it to which experiences are attached as the self’s private property^
(my emphasis).4
Whilst less central to Peirce’s work, this commitment to the constructive nature of
experience lay at the core of James’s pragmatist vision, underlying his famous remark
that Bthe trail of the human serpent is… over everything^ (James 1907/2000, 68). For
James, our status as a certain kind of creature inextricably colours our commerce with
the world. Likewise, Dewey’s famous interactive conception of knowledge holds that
knowledge of the world is formed as an adaptive response to environmental circum-
stances given the agent’s needs and purposes, an ongoing process in which the subject
moulds and constructs the very environments it inhabits (Dewey 1925; Godfrey-Smith
2013). For this reason, Dewey was a central influence on Gibson and the tradition of
3 As I argue below, the existence of internal representations is consistent with pragmatism. Peirce, for
example, outlined a sophisticated analysis of representation and was himself committed to mental represen-
tations. Pragmatists are rather against a particular understanding of what representation amounts to (Price
2013). I argue below that what they reject is twofold: first, an understanding of internal representations as
Bmirrors of nature^ (see S3); and second, the idea that intentionality (the paradigm of which is propositional
thought) can exist independently of sociolinguistic practices (see S5).
4 Quoted in Bacon (2012, 52).
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ecological psychology, where the idea that an organism’s perceived environment
is fundamentally a world of Baffordances^—roughly, opportunities for environ-
mental intervention (Chemero 2009)—highlights the functional importance of its
practical interests, abilities and morphology in bringing forth its experienced
world (Gibson 1979).5
A similar conviction is central to the work of various neo-pragmatists. For Rorty, for
example, the contents of human thought and language can only be understood in the
context of practices with specific ends that implicate such contingent features as our
evolutionary ancestry, biological endowment, cognitive structure, spatiotemporal loca-
tion and sociocultural context—and, above all, our culturally mediated interests and
purposes given this variegated background. Likewise, Price’s (2013) Bglobal
expressivism^ seeks to understand our various vocabularies in terms of the Bcontingent,
shared dispositions^ and Bpractical stances^ they exhibit, rather than in terms of
representational relations like truth or reference (Price 2013, 62). Indeed, as with
Quine (1960) and Rorty (1989), Price (2013, 63) argues that there are Bno cases in
which the contingencies on the speakers’ side go to zero,^ in line with James’s
suggestion about the trail of the human serpent.
The functional primacy of pragmatic success is therefore relativized to the contin-
gent properties and interests of the subject pursuing that success. In this way, the
organism—in the case of human beings, a product of a complex web of biological and
cultural circumstance—makes an active contribution to the construction of its experi-
enced world. For this reason, Price (2011, 30) recommends that we abandon the
metaphor of a mirror in our conception of mind and language in favour of a holo-
graphic data projector, a metaphor intended to capture the extent to which an organ-
ism’s experienced world is as much a matter of dynamic creation as reflection. The
Bprojection^ here constitutes the organism’s Bmanifest image^ (Sellars 1963) or Bnar-
cissistic ontology^ (Dennett 2013, 71), as much conditioned by the properties and
interests it finds itself with as by the environment it finds itself in.
2.3 The social mind
The foregoing commitments might leave the impression that pragmatism is an individ-
ualist creed, a movement committed to a fundamentally asocial mind. Of course,
nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, some have argued that an emphasis
on the philosophical significance of social practices is the core theme in the pragmatist
tradition (Bacon 2012). The third commitment I will focus on, then, is to the idea that
distinctively human forms of thought are made possible only within the context of
normatively structured social practices among language-users like ourselves. In a
slogan: intentionality—the very contents of our thoughts and linguistic expressions—
is an inextricably social phenomenon.
This commitment to a Bcommunitarian^ or Bsocial approach to intentionality^ (Satne
2017, 528) became central to the pragmatist tradition with the work of Dewey, who
advanced a Bsocial theory of mind^ in which Bgenuine thought is made possible only
within the context of a language-using community^ (Godfrey-Smith 2015, 805). For
Dewey, thought arises within the context of symbol-using behaviour, and symbol-using
5 This commitment has strongly influenced the enactivist tradition (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007).
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behaviour is a distinctively social activity, even if one can subsequently exploit this
socially endowed ability internally in the form of inner speech (Dewey 1925; cf. also
Godfrey-Smith 2013, 287). BLanguage,^ he wrote, Bis the cherishing mother of all
significance^ (Dewey 1925, 154). A similar conviction surfaced in Mead’s work, another
early pragmatist thinker who Bdeveloped a comprehensive social theory of action and
language^ (Bernstein 2010, 8). Indeed, these authors’ emphasis on the sociolinguistic
nature of human thought prefigured its emergence in the work of later philosophers such
as Wittgenstein, Quine, Rorty and Brandom by some decades.
Among contemporary pragmatists, Brandom (1994, 2010) is the most prominent
advocate of this view, although it also features prominently in the work of Haugeland
(1990) (who self-identifies as a neo-pragmatist (Haugeland 1990, 422)) and in Price’s
(2011, ch.8) hypothesis that the truth norm emerges only in the context of social
disagreement—an interesting suggestion I return to in Section 6. In Brandom’s
(1994) extended treatment of the idea, the semantic norms that underlie intentional
content arise within the social practice of Bgiving and asking for reasons^ (Sellars
1963)—that is, within structured social interactions in which assertions are held
answerable to socially instituted inferential norms. The distinctively human mind and
the unique kinds of normative statuses it can exhibit are thus construction of culture
(Brandom 2002a, 2002b; cf. also Haugeland 1990). The upshot is that Bwe can only
make sense of contentful thinking in the context of shared ways of life in which social
norm compliance is developed, maintained and stabilized through social practices^
(Hutto and Satne 2015, 527).
For this reason, this third pragmatist commitment is diametrically opposed to a more
traditional and orthodox conception of intentionality, in which the contents of our
thoughts exist prior to and are simply communicated with language, understood as Ba
set of publicly accessible signs that are combined according to certain rules to form
meaningful sentences^ (Satne 2017, 529; cf. Grice 1957; Lewis 1975). On this view,
Boriginal (i.e. underived) intentionality^ (Searle 1980) resides first in the head, and the
cognitive significance of cultural artifacts like natural languages is derived. For prag-
matists, by contrast:
BThe idea is that contentful tokens, like ritual objects, customary performances,
and tools, occupy determinate niches within the social fabric – and these niches
"define" them as what they are. Only in virtue of such culturally instituted roles
can tokens have contents at all^ (Haugeland 1990, 404).
On this view, then, the human mind is a constitutively social mind, not formed prior to
the human animal’s immersion in sociolinguistic practices but rather emergent from
such practices. Our third pragmatist commitment is thus maximally un-Cartesian: the
very contents of our thoughts are a function of our immersion in social practices of
evaluation within which assertions and judgments are held answerable to culturally
instituted norms.
2.4 Summary
This whistle-stop tour of the pragmatist tradition has been skeletal. Nevertheless, it
presents a very general picture that I think has been largely common to the tradition, a
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picture that has grounded the many more concrete commitments and theses of specific
pragmatist authors. This is a picture in which minds function in the service of pragmatic
coping, in which contingent and idiosyncratic contributions of the organism in its
biological and social milieu are functionally crucial to the construction of it experienced
world, and in which distinctively human forms of thought are made possible only
within the nexus of normatively structured sociolinguistic interactions characteristic of
human life.
My thesis is that this extremely broad vision of the human animal meshes
beautifully with recent work from cognitive neuroscience, where a Bnew theory is
taking hold^ (Hohwy 2013, 1), a Bparadigm shift^ (Friston et al. 2017, 1) that
some believe is ushering us into a new, Bpredictive era^ in the history of psychol-
ogy (Gładziejewski 2015). Specifically, I contend that this emerging theory pow-
erfully vindicates and illuminates the first two commitments enumerated above,
and positively mandates the third.
First, however, I turn to an elegant presentation and interpretation of this emerging
framework in cognitive neuroscience that draws exactly the opposite conclusion.
3 The Cartesian predictive mind
The term Bpredictive processing^ is used in numerous ways in both the scientific and
philosophical literature. As I use the term (following Clark 2016), it refers to a
maximally ambitious theoretical framework for understanding the brain as an Borgan
for prediction error minimization^ (Hohwy 2014, 1), a process that implicates hierar-
chical predictive coding and probabilistic generative models of the body and environ-
ment’s causal structure (cf. Clark 2013, 2016; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013; Kiefer and
Hohwy 2017). This theoretical framework has generated an enormous amount of
research, excitement, and hostility in recent years. In this section, I first outline those
core tenets of the theory in its maximally BCartesian^ guise that can plausibly be
extracted from the work of Hohwy (2013, 2014) and others (Kiefer and Hohwy 2017),
and then explain why the resultant conception of cognition is so radically at odds with
the pragmatist vision of mind outlined in Section 2.6 In later sections, I identify subtler
aspects of the framework, along with its connection to the Bfree-energy principle^
(Friston 2009, 2010).
First, then, predictive processing is often presented as offering a solution to the
Bproblem of perception^ (Hohwy 2013, ch.1). Following Helmholtz, the problem is
how to veridically infer the distal causes of the brain’s sensory inputs given access only
to the sensory inputs themselves. The problem is that such sensory evidence is
inherently noisy and ambiguous, such that its environmental causes are radically
underdetermined. Bayesian perceptual psychology models the solution to this problem
in terms of Bayesian inference, where Bayes’s theorem identifies an optimal way of
updating one’s beliefs given new evidence under conditions of uncertainty (Rescorla
2013). Specifically, it states that the posterior probability of a hypothesis given new
6 I don’t go so far as to positively ascribe the interpretation of predictive processing in this Section to Hohwy,
if only because he is alert to many of the points raised in Section 4. Nevertheless, it can plausibly be
reconstructed from his work (e.g. Hohwy 2013, 2014; Kiefer and Hohwy 2017).
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evidence P(H/E) is proportional to that hypothesis’ likelihood P(E/H)—how well the
hypothesis predicts the evidence—weighted by its prior probability P(H):
Baye
0
s Theorem
 
P H Ejð Þ ¼ P E Hjð Þ*P Hð Þ=P Eð Þ:
Despite the widespread influence of Bayesian modelling in perceptual psychology
and cognitive science more generally, it confronts two big challenges (Rescorla 2013;
Tenenbaum et al. 2011): first, how is Bayesian inference approximated algorithmically
in the brain? When dealing with sufficiently large hypothesis spaces, Bayesian infer-
ence can be extremely slow and often computationally intractable, which has led
researchers in statistics and machine learning to develop various procedures that
approximate the results of exact Bayesian inference (Penny 2012). Second, how are
such algorithms implemented in the brain’s neural networks?
Predictive processing can then be seen—and is often presented—as an answer to
these questions, explaining how brains come to approximate Bayesian inference in
cortical information-processing through hierarchical predictive coding and precision-
weighted prediction error minimization (Clark 2016; Hohwy 2013; Penny 2012).
To understand how this works, consider first how Bayesian inference can be
operationalised in terms of predictions and precision-weighted prediction errors. The
idea is relatively straightforward: if one assumes Gaussian probability distributions, one
can calculate one’s posterior distribution by comparing the mean value p of the prior
distribution with the mean value e of the evidence to compute a mismatch signal or
prediction error (Denève and Jardri 2016).7 Bayes’ theorem then dictates how to weight
the prediction error in updating the prior, which in turn determines the Blearning rate^:
the higher the weight assigned to the prediction error, the more the agent learns from
the evidence, and thus the more it should update its priors (Hohwy 2017). This weight
should thus be evaluated by comparing the uncertainty of each source of information,
which can be calculated by the relative precisions (the inverse of the variance) of the
two distributions. Intuitively, if one’s expectations or evidence are extremely noisy (i.e.
highly variable) they should not influence the posterior estimate as much. Likewise, as
an agent learns more, its priors should become increasingly precise, thus ensuring that
its prior knowledge plays a greater role in guiding inference.
For this to work in the case of real-world perception, however, simple Bayesian
inference is not enough. The easiest way to see this is as follows: if a system performs
Bayesian inference, it will keep prediction error at an optimal minimum, limited by
ineliminable noise (Hohwy 2017). (This simplify reflects the optimal character of
Bayesian inference). The sensory evidence, however, is a function of complex,
interacting hidden causes in a dynamic environment that contains regularities nested
within regularities. For a system to optimally minimize prediction error under such
conditions, then, it requires some means of deconvolving the structural elements of such
environments to separate out regularities at different scales. This requires hierarchical
Bayesian inference: if sensory input is a function of a complex, hierarchically nested
causal structure, the perceptual system must effectively invert this hierarchical
7 For convenience, I run together the distinction between distributions and density functions throughout, as it
is irrelevant to the paper.
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structure, forming expectations over different regularities at different scales and
exploiting such longer-term expectations to modulate its learning rate in context-
sensitive ways (cf. Clark 2016; Hohwy 2017). The resultant inferential architecture
functions as what’s known as a Bhierarchical Gaussian filter,^ filtering regularities in
the evidence at multiple scales and exploiting such hierarchically distributed expecta-
tions to predict the incoming evidence in context-sensitive ways (Mathys et al. 2014).
In such an architecture, the hypotheses at each level then function as the sensory
evidence for the level above (Denève and Jardri 2016).
Predictive processing then advances a Bprocess theory^ for how this process of
hierarchical Bayesian inference is approximated and implemented in the brain (Friston
et al. 2017). Recall that a system that follows exact Bayesian inference in the manner
just described will optimally minimize long-term prediction error. If this is right,
however, then—subject to certain technical assumptions that fall beyond the scope of
the current paper—a system can be expected to approximate the results of exact
Bayesian inference in proportion to its ability to minimize long-term prediction error
(Kiefer and Hohwy 2017). The importance of this observation is this: whilst it is
implausible to think that the brain explicitly follows exact Bayesian inference in the
manner described above, it is not implausible to suppose that the brain can construct
hierarchically structured models of the world with which to anticipate the sensory
signal via recurrent feedback connections (Hohwy 2017; Kiefer and Hohwy 2017).
Indeed, there is extensive evidence of both this hierarchical structure in the neocortex
and the prolific role of Bbackwards^ or Btop-down^ connections carrying signals back
towards primary sensory areas (Pendl et al. 2017).
Predictive processing capitalizes on such evidence. At its core is the idea of predic-
tive coding, a data compression strategy whereby only the unpredicted elements of a
signal—the prediction errors—are fed forward for further stages of information-pro-
cessing. In the case of the brain, the idea is that Btop-down^ synaptic connections in the
brain from higher (e.g. frontal or temporal) cortical areas carry predictions of activity to
lower levels in the cortical hierarchy until they reach proximal sensory input, and
Bbottom-up^ connections carry the residual prediction errors (Clark 2013).8 When this
simple information-processing strategy is combined with a vision of the brain as an
organ whose function is to minimize prediction errors, the upshot is a process that—as
Hohwy (2017, 10) puts it—is Bmore mechanistic and less literally inferential.^ Roughly,
the proposal is that as the brain becomes increasingly successful at minimizing predic-
tion error, it comes to both install and then continually update a veridical generative
model of environmental causes—a Bmirror of nature^ (Hohwy 2013)—in a way that
approximates the results of exact Bayesian inference in the long run. As Hohwy (2013,
55) puts it, Bneuronal populations are just trying to generate activity that anticipates their
input. In the process of doing this they realize Bayesian inference.^
That—in an extremely skeletal nutshell—is predictive processing’s account of learn-
ing and Bperceptual inference.^ Of course, the foregoing overview only scratches the
surface of the relevant technical literature, and says nothing about how other cognitive
phenomena are supposed to fit in within this framework (see Section 4 below).
Nevertheless, this summary should give some indication of the extreme elegance of
8 Given space constraints, I ignore the role of lateral connections in this brief overview (cf. Kiefer
and Hohwy 2017).
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this account—specifically, its beautiful marriage of tradition Cartesian internalism with
the technical resources of contemporary machine learning, statistics, and cognitive
neuroscience. Encased within a dark skull and without supervision from an external
teacher, predictive brains exploit the statistical patterns in their sensory input to reconstruct
the causal-probabilistic structure of the objective reality beyond it—a Bvirtual reality^
(Hobson et al. 2014) or Bcontrolled hallucination^ (Grush 2004) with which they can form
judgements, tests hypotheses, and revise beliefs. From an initial Helmholtzian vision of
perception as abductive inference, we arrive at an explanation of how the optimality of
Bayesian inference might genuinely be approximated and implemented in cortical circuitry
via this recursive process of prediction revision and model-updating.
More importantly, however, this brief overview should exemplify how profoundly this
vision of the mind contradicts each of the defining pragmatist commitments outlined in
Section 2. In place of the primacy of the practical (Section 2.1) and the profound ways in
which the organism structures its experienced world (Section 2.2), the brain is viewed as an
organ for veridically reconstructing the objective structure of the signal source via an
approximation to optimal Bayesian inference. In addition, this process confers on the brain
intentional states (Section 2.3), enabling it to form truth-conditional hypotheses about the
causes of its sensory input and continually test these hypotheses against sensory evidence—
a brain-bound conception of original intentionality radically at oddswith the social theory of
mind advanced in the pragmatist tradition (Hohwy 2013; Kiefer and Hohwy 2017).
It is difficult to imagine a conception of mentality more in tension with the pragmatist
themes enumerated in Section 2. It is also—or so I argue next—mistaken as an interpreta-
tion of the science. Specifically, it rests on a dubious philosophical overlay not motivated by
the content of predictive processing itself.
4 The pragmatic predictive brain
I began above with the Bproblem of perception^: given access only to the evolving activity
at the organism’s sensory transducers, how can the brain infer the objective structure of the
ambient environment? This Bproblem,^ of course, perfectly exemplifies what Dewey
(1925, 1948) referred to as the Bspectator theory of knowledge^: encased within a lonely
skull, the brain is viewed as a statistical inference engine analogous to the artificial neural
networks familiar from machine learning—that is, systems explicitly and intentionally
designed by human beings to exploit the statistical patterns in their input data to recover
the objective structure responsible for that data (Kiefer and Hohwy 2017). On this view, the
function of prediction error minimization is to enable brains to produce a copy—an internal
mirror—of the objective structure of the ambient environment.
I argued in Section 2 that pragmatism is fundamentally opposed to any such
vision of cognitive activity. In this section, I argue that predictive processing is as
well (cf. Anderson 2017; Barrett 2016; Bruineberg et al. 2016; Clark 2016; Seth 2015;
Williams 2017).9 To see this, one must first relate predictive processing to the Bfree-
9 Anderson (2017) chastises the Bproblem of perception^ for assuming that sensory input is ambiguous, an
issue I do not address in this paper. In addition, Anderson advocates a regulative perspective on brain function
as an alternative to the problem of perception, but fails to note that this perspective is endorsed by predictive
processing itself (cf. Williams 2017).
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energy principle^ as advanced by Friston (2009, 2010). Any thorough overview of the
free-energy principle falls beyond the scope of the current paper. Nevertheless, its central
ideas can be gleaned relatively straightforwardly, and it is crucial in adjudicating the
debate I address here. Specifically, it reveals the underlying rationale for prediction error
minimization as a special case of a deeper imperative in biological agents to self-
organize around their homeostatic set-points under conditions tending towards increas-
ing disorder (Friston 2010). That is, it reveals prediction error minimization as the
solution to a fundamentally pragmatic—not representational—problem (Bruineberg
et al. 2016; Clark 2016; Seth 2015). As I argue in later sections, this has enormous
significance for discussions about intentionality and the predictive brain.
The free-energy principle begins from the observation that Bthe defining char-
acteristic of biological systems is that they maintain their states and form in the
face of a constantly changing environment,^ thereby somehow violating Bthe
fluctuation theorem, which generalizes the second law of thermodynamics^
(Friston 2010, 1). Given this surprising characteristic, one can derive the follow-
ing fundamental job description for brains: Bto regulate the organism’s internal
milieu^ (Sterling and Laughlin 2015, xvi.). This perspective on brain function
effectively follows insights from mid-twentieth-century cybernetics in modelling
brains as regulators responsible for maintaining essential homeostatic variables
within viable bounds (Conant and Ashby 1970; cf. Seth 2015; Williams and
Colling 2017). The novel contribution of the free-energy principle is to provide
an information-theoretic interpretation both of what this homeostatic process
amounts to and how it can be achieved in biological agents via the minimization
of a quantity to which they have internal access. Specifically, it states Bthat any
self-organizing system that is at equilibrium with its environment must minimize
its free energy^ (Friston 2010, 1).
For our purposes, there are two important components to this idea. The first is the
idea that homeostasis can be described as the minimization of long-term, average
surprisal, where Bsurprisal^ is an information-theoretic quantity that names the im-
probability of an outcome relative to a probability distribution (Friston 2010; cf. also
Hohwy 2015). The intuitive idea here is straightforward. If a probability distribution is
defined over possible states of an organism, homeostasis (i.e. being alive) requires it to
occupy and revisit an extremely narrow subset of such possible states. Relative to
optimal homeostatic regulation, then, deviations from homeostasis effectively result in
increasingly improbable (highly Bsurprising^) states. As such, homeostasis can be
described as the minimization of long-term surprisal. As many have noted, this makes
surprisal profoundly organism-relative: it names states that are non-optimal relative to
an organism’s contingent phenotype (Friston 2010, 2; cf. also Bruineberg et al. 2016;
Seth 2015; Williams 2017).
The second important idea is a proposal concerning how biological systems can
avoid surprising states. Although the technical details are formidable here, the central
point for our concerns is Friston’s proposal that a tractable optimization task for brains
to perform that approximates the minimization of long-term surprisal is the minimiza-
tion of variational free energy, another information-theoretic quantity that provides an
upper bound on surprisal and—under a set of technical assumptions (cf. Friston 2009,
2010; Hohwy 2015)—translates to long-term, average prediction error (Friston 2010).
In other words, the problem that prediction error minimization solves is homeostatic
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regulation, such that the former Bis, essentially, a tool for self-organisation^
(Gładziejewski 2015, 563).
If this is right, the upshot is simple: the function of prediction error minimization is
not the veridical reconstruction of the organism’s ambient environment, but homeo-
static regulation—a problem that is positively defined in terms of the organism’s
idiosyncratic practical interests. As Barrett (2016, 3) puts it:
BA brain did not evolve for rationality… or accurate perception. All brains
accomplish the same core task (Sterling and Laughlin 2015): to efficiently ensure
resources for physiological systems within an animal’s body… so that an animal
can grow, survive and reproduce.^
Further, note that the process described in Section 3 of updating top-down predictions
to effectively anticipate the incoming signal is in itself impotent with respect to this
goal. That is, it is no good predicting sensory inputs if those inputs signify the
organism’s death (Hohwy 2013, 85). What the brain needs, then, is some means of
actively changing its sensory inputs. Within the context of predictive processing, this
corresponds to active inference, the opposite of Bperceptual inference^ as outlined in
Section 3: rather than updating top-down predictions to bring them into alignment with
sensory inputs, the brain actively moves the body to generate the sensory inputs it has
been designed to expect (Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013, 84–9). Ultimately, the funda-
mental predictions here concern the defining homeostatic variables of the organism
(Friston 2010). As Bruineberg et al. (2016) stress, this makes active inference func-
tionally primary in predictive processing: it is only by acting on the environment to
maintain its optimal states that an organism can change its sensory input and thus avoid
surprising experiences. Any Bperceptual inference^ that occurs is thus answerable to
this pragmatic end (see Section 5 below).
These observations have two important implications. First, the superficial appear-
ance of a dramatic tension between predictive processing and the first pragmatist
commitment outlined in Section 2 dissolves to reveal something much more interesting.
When situated in this broader theoretical context, predictive processing does not just
vindicate but powerfully illuminates that commitment: the schematic view that prag-
matic coping should be functionally primary in accounts of the mind is given concrete
expression in a scientific vision of how cognitive processes emerge in the service of the
ultimate kind of pragmatic success—namely, maintaining the organism’s viability
under conditions described by the second law of thermodynamics.
Second, this framework reveals how predictive processing might further illuminate
the second commitment outlined in Section 2: once we situate prediction error mini-
mization in this pragmatic context of homeostatic regulation, it becomes clear that any
vision of the brain as simply recovering the objective structure of the distal environment
becomes deeply problematic (Anderson 2017; Bruineberg et al. 2016; Clark 2016;
Williams 2017). Instead, we must confront the profound organism-relativity of experi-
ence. In other words, we should expect profoundly narcissistic nervous systems (cf.
Akins 196; Williams 2017): that is, nervous systems whose responses to the environ-
ment are mediated entirely by the pragmatic, homeostatic concerns of the organism.10
10 This generalises Akins’ (1996) famous idea of Bnarcissistic sensory systems.^
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Barrett (2016, 2017) introduces the helpful concept of the Baffective niche^ to capture
this organism-relative character of the brains’ generative model within the predictive
processing framework. The affective niche is Bspecies-specific^ and includes Bonly the
parts of the animal’s physical surroundings that the brain has judged relevant for
growth, survival and reproduction^ (Barrett 2016, 6).
These considerations, then, suggest that the initial appearance of a deep conflict
between pragmatism and predictive processing is illusory. Far from an image of minds
as passive spectators on the world, recovering the objective structure of the environ-
ment like an idealised scientist, predictive processing advances a fundamentally prag-
matic brain, striving to maintain the viability of the organism under hostile conditions
and in so doing actively generating an affective niche—an experienced world struc-
tured by the idiosyncratic practical interests of the organism. What emerges is some-
thing much closer to Price’s (2011) metaphor of a Bholographic data projector^ (see
Section 2.2) than a passive reflection of an independently identifiable world. As Clark
(2015, 4) puts it, it is a vision of experience that is Bmaximally distant from a passive
(Bmirrors of nature^) story.^
Nevertheless, onemight still object that predictive processing’s apparent consiliencewith
the first two pragmatist themes outlined in Section 2 is irrelevant given its stark opposition to
the third. After all, even if predictive brains are pragmatic and narcissistic, don’t they still
generate in-the-head intentional states in a manner flatly inconsistent with pragmatism’s
social vision of mind? Indeed, even many authors who agree with the points I advance in
this section nevertheless accept that predictive processing does explain the emergence of
original intentionality in brain states (e.g. Barrett 2016; Clark 2016; Seth 2015).
I next argue that this is mistaken. In fact, once one situates prediction error
minimization in the broader theoretical context revealed in this section, it becomes
clear that it lacks the requisite normativity to explain intentionality. The upshot of
this—or so I argue in Section 6—is that the direction of explanatory illumination
runs in both directions: predictive processing positively mandates an extra-neural
account of intentional states of just the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian
vison of intentional content—the third pragmatist theme outlined in Section 2—
can provide.
5 Intentionality and the predictive mind
In this section, I argue that prediction error minimization is inadequate on its own to
explain the emergence of original intentionality. I then consider and reject two objec-
tions to this argument. First, however, I raise an issue that must be set aside.
Consonant with a broader debate in recent cognitive science, there is a growing literature
on to what extent predictive processing advances a representational theory of cognition,
with some arguing that it does (Clark 2016; Gladziejewski 2015; Hohwy 2013; Williams
2017; Williams and Colling 2017) and others that it doesn’t (Gallagher and Allen 2016;
Bruineberg et al. 2016; Hutto 2017). In line with common assumptions in the philosophical
literature, this debate is often identifiedwith the debate concerning to what extent it explains
intentionality, typically understood in terms of content and thus veridicality conditions.
I regard this as a mistake (see Williams 2017). Specifically, it runs together two
distinct species of representation: first, the concept of representation as proxy or stand-
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in; and second, the concept of representation as judgement, where Bjudgement^
subsumes any representational state identified with veridicality conditions and thus
includes the essential normativity of intentionality (see below). Of course, internal
proxies for environmental states might play a central role in the explanation of
intentionality (see Section 6). The point is just that they are not identical with
intentional states.
There are three reasons why. First, the exploitation of structures that function as
proxies for other states or conditions is plausibly ubiquitous in biological systems
(Bechtel 2008, ch.5; Williams and Colling 2017). Indeed, it is a central tenet of the
Bgood regulator theorem^ (Conant and Ashby 1970) developed by the free-energy
principle that all optimal regulative systems exploit structures that are isomorphic to the
systems they regulate (Friston 2010). 11 By contrast, it is not plausible that truth-
evaluable intentional states are similarly ubiquitous.12 Second, and relatedly, one can
explain how a structure performs the role of a proxy without talking about content,
veridicality conditions, or even the possibility of misrepresentation (cf. Bechtel 2008,
ch.5). Intentional content is thus not necessary for something to function as a proxy.
Finally, functioning as a proxy is not sufficient to possess intentional content: one
cannot answer one of the hardest problems in the history of philosophy—namely, the
emergence of intentionality—by pointing to the regulative behaviour of plants (Calvo
and Friston 2017) (see Section 5.2 below).
To see the importance of this distinction, consider Anderson and Chemero’s (2013)
claim that predictive processing conflates two distinct senses of the term Bprediction.^
On one sense of that word, Bprediction1,^ it identifies the local anticipatory role of
signals within the cortical hierarchy as they are matched against activity at lower levels.
On another sense, Bprediction2,^ it describes a belief about how the world is. Their
contention is that all the relevant neuroscience gives you is prediction1, not prediction2,
and thus that predictive processing is non-representational.
That is too quick, however. I agree with Anderson and Chemero (2013) that
predictive processing is not entitled to prediction2 (see below). In other words, it does
not explain original intentionality. Nevertheless, there is an important third option that
they neglect (cf. Williams 2017): namely, that what explains the brain’s ability to
successfully predict1 its sensory inputs and guide behaviour is that it exploits a
proxy—the brain’s generative model—for interest-relative aspects of the environment’s
causal structure. In that sense, then, predictive processing plausibly is representational.
Indeed, plausibly all biological systems are. But it doesn’t follow that it explains
intentionality. 13 As such, it is not the relevant kind of Brepresentation^ that has
concerned pragmatists (Rorty 1979 makes a similar point). To put the point bluntly:
pragmatism is not undermined by thermostats—a paradigmatic regulative system that
11 Of course, which systems they regulate is specified relative to their homeostatic function, ensuring
consistency with Section 4.
12 Sims (2016) argues otherwise, but this is because he simply takes for granted that predictive processing
explains intentionality.
13 Of course, one can simply stipulate that veridicality conditions are the essential property of representations
and thus seek to replace talk of the generative model with some other set of expressions (e.g. Bruineberg et al.
2016; Hutto 2017). This understanding of terms like Bmodel^ is at odds with how the term is understood in
traditions such as cybernetics and control theory, however. Further, exploitable structural similarity is different
from mere detection or causal covariation (see Williams and Colling 2017), so the trivialising arguments
against such latter relations—advanced, for example, by Ramsey (2007)—do not work.
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exploits a stand-in (the level of mercury) for an interest-relative (in this case, our
interests) environmental variable (ambient temperature). It would be undermined if
thermostats acquired truth-conditional beliefs via this regulative function (that is,
independent of human interpretation).
With this cleared up, I turn now to explain why predictive processing cannot explain
original intentionality.
5.1 Prediction error minimization and intentionality
For convenience, I will understand intentionality minimally as truth conditions, both
because this is standard in the literature—for example, Kiefer and Hohwy (2017, 17)
explicitly contend that predictive signals possess Bfull-fledged truth-evaluable
content^—and because it characterises the paradigmatic intentional state of
belief. My argument is straightforward: as noted in Section 4, the function of
prediction error minimization is not representational success. Therefore there is
a root mismatch between prediction error minimization and truth. Therefore it
can’t explain intentionality.
To take this more slowly, intentionality is an inextricably normative phenomenon
(Brandom 1994; Kripke 1982;McDowell 1994). That is, intentional states are essentially
Bliable to assessment of correctness of representation, which is a special way of being
answerable or responsible to what is represented^ (Brandom 1994, 6). Given this, an
enormous amount of philosophical work has been devoted to explaining how intentional
states acquire this normative status: what makes it the case that some alleged represen-
tational vehicle—an utterance, brain state, sentence, etc.—can be in error relative to how
things are? In the current context, what makes it the case that some prediction1 is true if
and only if some environmental condition obtains and false if it doesn’t?
An obvious suggestion—developed by Hohwy (2013, ch.8) at some length in an
explicit attempt to address this issue of normativity—is that the relevant norm against
which representational success is evaluated is prediction error minimization. That is, if
brains are organs for prediction error minimization, can’t prediction1s be evaluated
relative to their contribution to this overarching goal? On this view, Bmisperception…
[is] perceptual inferences that move the creature away from this goal: misperception is
when prediction error increases^ (Hohwy 2013, 174). Hohwy (2013, 175-9) goes on to
qualify this statement by replacing prediction error with long-term, average prediction
error to guard against the possibility that prediction1s might on any given occasion
minimize prediction error despite being false. Nevertheless, the basic idea remains the
same: successful representation is identified with successful (long-term) prediction
error minimization, such that we can identify the truth conditions of prediction1s by
reference to those conditions in which they function properly. As such, the proposal
bears a striking resemblance to teleosemantic approaches to intentional content in
which representational error is explained by appeal to malfunctions in evolutionarily
selected information-carrying structures (cf. Millikan 1984).14
14 Given space constraints, I ignore Kiefer and Hohwy’s (2017) recent proposal that one can explain
misrepresentation in terms of the BKullbach-Leibler divergence.^ The reason for this is twofold: first, this
quantity measures the mismatch between two internal models (the generative and recognition model), and thus
requires a prior story of how such model states acquire their contents, which I address in the text; and second,
this mismatch effectively formalises the quantity of prediction error, so the same exact problems arise.
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Given the argument of Section 4, the problem with this strategy should be evident.
The function of prediction error minimization is not veridical representation of the
world but homeostasis (Seth 2015). This function, we saw, is profoundly organism-
relative: organisms find different states surprising, and so must minimize different
quantities (cf. Friston 2010). Truth, however, is not organism-relative in this way.
Specifically, this would flatly contradict the normativity of intentionality—namely,
the fact that intentional states must be answerable to a genuinely independent standard
against which they can be evaluated. Further, it would flatly contradict the inferential
norms that underlie the application of the truth predicate: one cannot infer from the fact
that something is useful for an organism—for example, from the perspective of
biological homeostasis—that it is true (cf. Price 2011). As such, there is a root
mismatch between prediction error minimization and representational success.
Therefore the former cannot be used to explain the latter. Recall Barrett’s (2016, 3)
point that predictive brains Bdid not evolve for rationality… or accurate
perception.^ As Hohwy (2013, 180) himself puts it, for an organism to minimize
prediction error Bis for it to organize itself in a far-from-equilibrium state, thereby
insulating itself temporarily… from entropic disorder described by the second law
of thermodynamics.^ Optimal homeostatic regulation, however, is a different norm
from truth. As such, it doesn’t provide the requisite normativity to ground
intentional content. This argument effectively parallels what is probably the chief
challenge to teleosemantics: namely, that there is similarly a root mismatch
between biological function and representational success (Burge 2010).
There has recently been an emergence of Bstructural resemblance^ theories of
content within the predictive brain (Gładziejewski 2015; Williams 2017; Williams
and Colling 2017), endorsed by Hohwy (Kiefer and Hohwy 2017) himself. The central
idea here is that prediction error minimization induces a generative model that mirrors
and so resembles the causal-probabilistic structure of the bodily and environmental
causes of the brain’s evolving sensory inputs. Whilst Kiefer and Hohwy’s (2017)
proposal is complex and nuanced, the central idea is relatively straightforward. They
propose that the contents (i.e. truth-conditions) of predictive hypotheses are acquired
through their place in the broader structure of the generative model from which
they arise, which in turn recapitulates the causal structure of the environment in
the manner just suggested. As such, the contents of such predictions can be
identified with the possible worlds that correspond to (i.e. resemble) the state of
the brain’s generative model. 15 Such predictions are thus true just in case the
actual world aligns with the possible world determined by the state of the model
(Kiefer and Hohwy 2017, 24). In simplistic terms, one can think of this as
comparing the state of a statistical model that veridically represents reality with
the brain’s statistical model (Kiefer and Hohwy 2017, 24). 16 In this way they
15 In more technical terms, the parameters of the generative model determine the modal space wherein
possible worlds correspond to different (probability distributions over) the values of its random variables
(cf. Kiefer and Hohwy 2017).
16 Kiefer and Hohwy (2017) follow Gładziejewski (2015) in distinguishing two distinct kinds of representa-
tion: roughly, the failure of the model to match the environment’s causal structure, and the falsity of
judgements made within a model. My argument applies to each (because both require failure), but for
convenience I focus on the latter case.
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effectively advance an understanding of misrepresentation not tied to prediction
error minimization: misrepresentation is simply a failure of correspondence.17
There are two problems with this proposal, however. The first concerns the similar-
ity relationship. Given the narcissistic character of predictive brains, it is not obvious
that the structure of the generative model will find corresponding structure in the world
as described in some more objective (i.e. scientific) vocabulary (cf. Anderson 2017;
Bruineberg et al. 2016). Just think of the many constituents of our Bmanifest image,^ or
what Dennett (2013) calls our Bnarcissistic ontology^: cuteness, sweetness, justice,
beauty, and so on. Which parts of the structure of reality do they latch on to? Short of
this mirroring relation, however, it is not obvious that the proposal makes sense.
This just reflects the second and deeper problem, however: appealing to structural
resemblance does not address the relevant problem of normativity. Specifically, the
question still arises how the relevant norms against which internal brain structures can
be evaluated as true or false arise. The norm cannot be similarity itself (Cummins
1996): as Kiefer and Hohwy (2017, 22) themselves note, if the brain’s hierarchical
Bayesian networks represent possible worlds defined by their respective structures,
misrepresentation and so intentionality is impossible. 18 One therefore needs Ban
independent standard of comparison to define misrepresentation^ (Kiefer and Hohwy
2017, 22, fn.15). This, however, is the hard part: it is the challenge of explaining how
the judgements arise that bring internal structures into normative comparison with the
environment. And this returns us to the same problem: the relevant standard cannot be
success at prediction error minimization because of the non-equivalence between this
function and representational success.
I suspect that Kiefer and Hohwy (2017) are misled on this point by taking as their
paradigm of a prediction error minimizing system an artificial neural network—that is,
a thoroughly passive system explicitly designed by human agents to function as a
representational device. Under such conditions, we can evaluate its internal states
against its Btarget.^ Biological agents, however, are nothing like this: as per the free-
energy principle, their function is not to match predictions against sensory inputs
passively received from the world, but to change the world to match their homeostatic
expectations. As such, their goal is not truth. Therefore—contra Hohwy (2013)—one
cannot appeal to this goal to explain intentionality.
5.2 Objections
Before I address the significance of this point for the current paper, I address two likely
objections.
First, one might simply deny that there is the mismatch between prediction error
minimization and representational success I have suggested. As far as I can see, there
are two ways one might do this. First, one might concede that the function of prediction
error minimization is not representational success, but argue that the latter is neverthe-
less necessary for the former. On this view, prediction error minimization requires the
brain to objectively represent the world; as such, the former can stand in for
17 In fact, they argue that both are useful notions of misrepresentation.
18 Cummins (1996) addresses this problem by appeal to teleosemantics, but Kiefer and Hohwy (2017)
explicitly reject this idea.
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representational success. I think that this strategy is not attractive, largely for the
reasons outlined in Section 4. Of course, brains must be sufficiently responsive
to their environments to serve their pragmatic function of homeostatic regula-
tion. But there is no reason to suppose that activities conducive to homeostatic
regulation will produce truth if this responsiveness is entirely mediated through
a pragmatic lens (c.f. Anderson 2017, 7–8).
A more interesting response contends that prediction error minimization is repre-
sentational success—specifically, that it is success at representing one’s own existence.
As Friston (2010, 2) puts it, minimizing prediction error can be viewed as Bmaximizing
the sensory evidence for the agent’s existence.^ Whilst superficially attractive in the
current context, the problem is that this is the wrong kind of representational success. If
we identify minimizing prediction error with truth in this sense, we must acknowledge
that truth is organism-relative, because surprisal is organism-relative, and that is the
quantity that is being minimized in the predictive brain. But truth is not organism-
relative in this way for the reasons enumerated above. Therefore this response cannot
explain intentionality. Or—put another way—the challenge under discussion is to
explain the distinctive answerability of intentional states. To minimize prediction error,
however, is to effectively make the world answerable to you—to your expectations. It is
thus the wrong kind of answerability.
Second, one might object that predictive processing and the free-energy principle are
both inextricably Bayesian and pitched in terms of probability distributions. 19 For
example, we saw in Section 4 that the free-energy principle is cast in terms of
minimizing surprisal, which can be cast in terms of Bayesian model optimization
(Friston 2010). Relatedly, as noted in Section 3, minimizing prediction error is sup-
posed to approximate the results of exact Bayesian inference over time (Hohwy 2017).
As such, one might argue that such talk is inextricably intentional, and thus that one
cannot accept these theoretical frameworks without intentionality. That is, if they are
correct (the argument goes), they must explain intentionality.
I see two major problems with this objection.
First, insofar as these frameworks are Bayesian, it is Bayesian inference that plants
and bacteria engage in (Calvo and Friston 2017). Of course, maybe plants and bacteria do
have intentional states (cf. Sims 2016). The point is that this cannot be decided merely by
pointing out that they satisfy a certain formal description. As is familiar from computer
science, computational procedures and mathematical frameworks more generally can be
formally described (i.e. in a way that abstracts away from content) (Egan 2013). Thus the
mere fact that plants can be modelled with the formalism of probability theory does not
settle whether they have intentional states. As Anderson (2017) points out, Bayes’s
theorem itself reads the same whether it describes conditionalizing among scientists or
parameter-setting in a control system.
Second, insofar as it is Bayesian inference, it is a very strange kind of Bayesian
inference. Bayes’ theorem is typically thought of as a paradigm of rationality when
one’s evidence is given. Under such conditions, conditionalizing in accordance with
Bayes’s theorem will make one optimally responsive to how things are (as revealed in
the evidence). If one can deliberately alter the evidence, this changes things completely.
(Imagine a scientist who simply rejects any evidence not consistent with her favourite
19 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
Pragmatism and the predictive mind
theory). With prediction error minimization, however, this is the whole point: the set of
priors that determine homeostasis are from the point of view of the organism’s life
incontrovertible in the face of countervailing evidence. As Bruineberg et al. (2016, 16)
put it, Bif my brain is a scientist, it is a crooked and fraudulent scientist^ that is Bheavily
invested in ensuring the truth of a particular theory.^ Worse, this means that different
brains invest in the truth of different theories. Thus when Hohwy (2014) argues that
prediction error minimization just is Bayesian inference, one must remember that it is at
best Bayesian inference in a purely formal sense under conditions in which the
overriding aim is to change the evidence, not the priors.
6 Predictive brains and social minds
If I am right, prediction error minimization cannot on its own explain the emergence of
intentional states. As such, Hohwy’s (2013, 1) contention that it explains Bperception
and action and everything mental in between^ must be rejected. This has the following
consequence: if one wants to hold onto predictive processing as our best theory of what
the brain is doing, one must locate the source of intentionality outside of the brain. Of
course, this is exactly the prescription we saw associated with pragmatism in
Section 2.3: on this communitarian vision of mind, the semantic norms that ground
intentional content arise through normatively structured sociolinguistic practices. As
such, advocates of predictive processing require an account of intentional content of
exactly the sort that pragmatism looks well-placed to provide.
Of course, I cannot fully deliver on this suggestion in the remaining space. Instead, I
want to pick up from some remarks by Frith (2007) to provide some initial support and
suggestions in its defence. Contemplating how the norm of truth might emerge in the
context of predictive processing, Frith writes:
BIn the very distant past our ancestors… were alone, constructing their models of
the physical world, but unable to share them with others. At that time truth had no
relevance for these models… All that mattered was that the model worked by
predicting what would happen next^ (Frith 2007, 179).
Here Frith identifies the basic lesson of Section 5: in the context of neuronal processes
in the predictive brain, truth is irrelevant. He claims that what matters is prediction, but
we saw in Section 4 that even this is not quite right: what really matters is homeostatic
regulation (which in turn requires prediction). The basic point, however, is the same.
How, then, do our internal states come to be answerable to this norm? Frith’s (2007,
136) proposal is effectively pragmatist in spirit: Bquestions about the Btruth^ of the
brain’s models arise only when one brain communicates with another, and we discover
that another person’s model of the world is different from our own.^
In other words, the distinctive truth norm to which we hold our internal states
responsible emerges in the idiosyncratic human context of social coordination made
possible by language. Of course, this is exactly the communitarian vision of intention-
ality advocated in the pragmatist tradition since Dewey, and bears a striking resem-
blance to Price’s (2011) proposal (see Section 2.3) that the truth norm arises as a
Bconvenient friction^ to facilitate disagreement and the wealth of socially adaptive
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advantages that disagreement provides (cf. also Brandom 1994, ch.1). In the current
context, we might put the idea as follows: natural language and shared cultural practices
uniquely enable us to externalise our pragmatic predictive models and subject them to
public critique, comparison and evaluation, a process that institutes a kind of socially
constructed normativity against which we then hold our internal models and linguistic
acts answerable (cf. Brandom 1994; Haugeland 1990).
Interestingly, Clark (2016) advances a similar suggestion in the last chapters of his
recent monograph on the predictive mind. After outlining and exploring the core tenets
and explanatory power of predictive processing, he raises a worry flagged by
Roepstorff (2013) that the species-generality of the processes it posits leaves it myste-
rious what explains the seemingly novel kinds of cognition exhibited by human beings.
Clark’s (2016) suggestion, following on from much work in the tradition of 4e
cognition, is that what differentiates human cognition is not primarily what goes
on within our heads, but rather the way in which our brains get augmented and
transformed in the idiosyncratic environment of structured social interactions and
public symbol systems characteristic of human life. As he puts it, Bit is the
predictive brain operating in rich bodily, social, and technological context that
ushers minds like ours into the material realm.^ Of course, the explanation of our
propensity to inhabit such social and symbolic environments must itself have a
neural explanation. The suggestion, however, is Bthat [it was] some relatively
small neural… difference [that] was the spark that lit a kind of intellectual forest
fire^ (Clark 2014, 179).
This suggestion exactly recapitulates Dewey’s (1938/2008, 49) contention that the
distinctive abilities exhibited in human intelligence are Binstances of modifications
wrought within the biological organism by the cultural environment.^ Nevertheless,
Dewey and subsequent pragmatists go one step further: the proposal is not just that the
distinctive sociocultural environment has ampliative and transformative effects on our
cognitive capacities, but that it generates the very emergence of intentional content
itself (Brandom 1994). It is the norms that emerge in such structured cultural contexts
of evaluation and coordination to which the states of our internal models (i.e. pragmatic
proxies)—uniquely in the terrestrial world—are answerable.
Of course, this proposal is extremely schematic, and much more work is required to
show how previous proposals in the pragmatist tradition about the social construction
of content could be integrated with predictive processing. Nevertheless, it suggests a
surprising opportunity for mutual illumination between two frameworks that look for
all the world to produce radically opposing visions of mentality. From predictive
processing we learn the pragmatic origins of cognitive processes and the homeostatic
construction of an affective niche, and from pragmatism we learn how predictive brains
become transformed through structured processes of social coordination and evalua-
tion—practices that produce the very norms from which the contents of our thoughts
and utterances arise.
Although I have said little about what such an account might look like, I hope I have
done enough to reveal it as a project worth pursuing. To reiterate, once one recognises
the inadequacy of prediction error minimization to explain the distinctive normativity of
intentionality, one must locate the source of that normativity elsewhere. I contend that
pragmatism’s communitarian vision of the human mind provides the Belsewhere^: to
understand how predictive brains acquire intentional states, one must situate them in the
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broader environmental context of human culture and the qualitatively novel kinds of
normativity it generates.
Before ending, I want to briefly flag two principled objections to this proposal—in
the second case, as an impetus to the kinds of future work I think it provokes.
First, one might argue that sociocultural practices cannot play a distinctive explan-
atory role within the context of predictive processing, because the ability to participate
in such practices must be explained by predictive processing itself. As such, the
practices themselves are explanatorily redundant.20 This objection confuses the condi-
tions that enable predictive brains to participate in structured social practices for the
practices themselves, however. Of course, no pragmatist has ever denied that something
within the brain explains our capacity to participate in culture. The point is that such
cultural practices produce phenomena that brains—whether predictive or otherwise—
do not on their own.
A second and deeper objection is that the structured social practices I have appealed
to cannot solve the problem I have asked of them. Specifically, the worry is that just as
there is a mismatch between prediction error minimization and representational suc-
cess, there is likewise a mismatch between social approval and truth (Boghossian 2006;
Hutto and Satne 2015). As such, the proposal that social norms might ground content
(e.g. Brandom 1994; Kripke 1982) falls foul of the very problem I have raised for
predictive processing.
I cannot hope to address this enormous challenge to communitarian approaches to
intentionality in the remaining space here, except to note that the pragmatist’s response
is always the same: there is no alternative (Rorty 1979, 1989). That is, the world itself
cannot literally evaluate anything, and so socially constructed normativity is the best
one can hope for when it comes to explaining the emergence of intentional content
(Brandom 1994). For present purposes, the crucial point—stressed by Frith and many
others—is that linguistically mediated social coordination between human beings gives
rise to a genuinely novel and thus distinct kind of normativity from mere pragmatic
success. It makes us answerable to one another—which, for a social species like us,
effectively is the world (Rorty 1989). Elaborating this story—and exploring how the
distinctive explanatory resources of predictive processing might alter and adapt that
story in interesting ways—is a crucial project for future work.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that the initial appearance of a deep conflict between predictive process-
ing and pragmatism as outlined in Sections 2 and 3 is not just illusory, but that
something much more interesting is the case. Specifically, once one recognises the
way in which predictive processing both vindicates and illuminates the first two
pragmatist commitments outlined in Section 2, it becomes clear that the pragmatic,
narcissistic character of prediction error minimization is inadequate to capture the
distinctive normativity of intentionality. This effectively means that advocates of
predictive processing require an extra-neural explanation of intentionality of just the
sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vison of human thought—the final and most
20 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry.
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controversial pragmatist commitment outlined in Section 2—can provide. Frith’s
proposal about how the distinctive truth norm arises through communication provides
some initial impetus in that direction, but fully substantiating it is of course a crucial
task for future work. Nevertheless, I hope I have shown that it is work worth doing, and
that the current paper has been a valuable contribution to the growing literature on
predictive processing and its relationship to key debates in the philosophy of mind,
cognitive science, and just about everything else.
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